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We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive 
market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently 
small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily 
to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members 
moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) 
of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also 
impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to 
benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same. 
JEL Code: D10, D50, D62, D70. 
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Societies often experience a shift of bargaining power in households. For instance,
ceteris paribus, the modern heterosexual couple (multi-member household) is distin-
guished from the traditional heterosexual couple (household) by a shift of bargaining
power in favor of the female partner (female parent, woman in the household). Such
a shift induces a change in household demand for goods and services. In turn, mar-
ket clearing might occur at di®erent prices and, consequently, the terms of trade for
households might be altered.
It is the consequences, not the causes of shifts in intra-household bargaining power
that interest us here. We are concerned with pure economic (positive) e®ects on the
allocation of resources, as well as welfare (normative) e®ects at both the individual and
societal levels. We are going to study those e®ects in a general equilibrium context.
Our study reveals that the magnitude of equilibrium price responses to a shift of
intra-household bargaining power matters. If price e®ects are su±ciently small, then
typically an individual bene¯ts from an increase of bargaining power | necessarily to
the detriment of others. In particular, the other member(s) of the household will lose.
In contrast, if price e®ects are drastic, then the members of the individual's household
all bene¯t or are all harmed. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of
households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a
sociological group tends to bene¯t if he can increase his bargaining power, but su®ers if
others in his group enjoy more bargaining power. For quasi-linear preferences, however,
a change of the bargaining power within a particular household only impacts on the
distribution of the num¶ eraire in the household under consideration without a®ecting
the consumption of other commodities. A local change of bargaining power has no
price e®ect and does not a®ect the utility of individuals in other households.
The underlying model of the household satis¯es collective rationality in the sense of
Chiappori (1988a, 1992).1 It departs from traditional economic theory which has, for
the most part, treated households as if they were single consumers. The model admits
households with several, typically heterogeneous members who have individual prefer-
ences. A household takes market prices as given and makes an e±cient consumption
choice (in terms of the preferences of its members) subject to its budget constraint.
Di®erent households may use di®erent collective decision mechanisms. This departure
1See also the surveys by Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992, 1994).
2from the traditional market model enables us to investigate the interplay of dual roles
of households: households as collective decision making units on the one hand and as
competitive market participants on the other hand.
The current model starts from the general equilibrium model in Haller (2000) where
the household structure is ¯xed.2 We specialize by assuming that the e±cient collective
household decision is the result of (possibly asymmetric) Nash bargaining within the
household. This feature allows us to parametrize relative bargaining power, to perform
comparative statics and to answer the question at hand, how a shift of bargaining
power within households a®ects equilibrium allocation and welfare.
The model is introduced in the next section. In Section 3, we focus on a two-
person household embedded in a larger economy and study how a shift of bargaining
power within that household a®ects the consumption and welfare of its members. We
decompose the intra-household e®ects into two relevant e®ects, a pure bargaining e®ect
and a price e®ect. In the presence of negative intra-household externalities, there can
be an equilibrium with free disposal where the budget constraint is not binding for
the select two-person household and the household is not subject to a price e®ect.
Typically, however, the price e®ect is non-zero. It can be small (negligible) or large
(drastic).
In Section 4, we exemplify the di®erent scenarios suggested by the general compar-
ative statics of Section 2. We go through a sequence of representative examples, with
a two-person household and a one-person household, and examine the general equi-
librium implications of a shift of bargaining power within the two-person household.
We observe that at least one member is always a®ected by a shift of bargaining power
within the two-person household, but that the non-member may be a®ected as well.
We observe further that price e®ects may be drastic if preferences exhibit little substi-
tutability. We should mention that the ¯ndings for these two-household economies are
also valid for respective replica economies obtained from the representative examples,
provided that each of the two-person households of the replica economy undergoes the
same shift of intra-household bargaining power. These shifts constitute a particular
instance of a widespread shift of bargaining power in favor of a speci¯c sociological
group.
In Section 5, we investigate in more detail shifts of bargaining power in favor of
2See Gersbach and Haller (2001, 2002) for versions with variable household structure.
3a speci¯c sociological group, with added emphasis on inter-household or spill-over ef-
fects. We distinguish between \¯rst members" and \second members" of households.
With particular consumer characteristics, spill-overs are absent: The e®ects of a change
of bargaining power within a household are con¯ned to that household. With di®er-
ent consumer characteristics, spill-overs can occur exactly as described earlier. For
instance, a ¯rst member of a household bene¯ts from an increase in own bargaining
power, but loses if ceteris paribus ¯rst members of other households gain more bargain-
ing power. In Section 6, we o®er concluding remarks.
2 General Equilibrium Model
We consider a ¯nite pure exchange economy. The main departure from the traditional
model is that a household can have several members, each with their own preferences.
Fixed Household Structure.
The population is divided into ¯nitely many households h = 1;:::;n, with n ¸ 2.
Each household h consists of ¯nitely many members i = hm with m = 1;:::;m(h),
m(h) ¸ 1. Put I = fhm : h = 1;:::;n; m = 1;:::;m(h)g, the ¯nite population of
individuals to be considered.
Commodities, Endowments, and Individual Preferences.
The commodity space is I R
` with ` ¸ 1. Household h is endowed with a commodity
bundle !h 2 I R
`; !h > 0. The aggregate or social endowment is ! =
P
h !h. A generic
individual i = hm 2 I has:
² consumption set Xi = I R
`
+;
² preferences Â » i on the allocation space X ´
Q
j2I Xj represented by a utility
function Ui : X ¡! I R.
The consumption bundle of a generic individual i is denoted by xi. Let x = (xi);y =
(yi) denote generic elements of X. For h = 1;:::;n, de¯ne Xh =
Qm(h)
m=1 Xhm with
generic elements xh = (xh1;:::;xhm(h)). If x 2 X is an allocation, then for h = 1;:::;n,
household consumption is given by xh = (xh1;:::;xhm(h)) 2 Xh.
4We will allow for the possibility of consumption externalities. Following Haller
(2000), we shall restrict attention to the case where such consumption externalities, if
any, exist only between members of the same household. This is captured by the notion
of intra-household externalities where utility functions are restricted to the household
consumption xh, i.e.:
(E1) Intra-Household Externalities: Ui(x) = Ui(xh) for i = hm, x 2 X.
A special case is the absence of externalities to which we sometimes pay particular
attention. When there are no externalities, the utility function of an individual i
depends only on his consumption bundle xi, i.e.
(E2) Absence of Externalities: Ui(x) = Ui(xi) for i = hm, x = (xi) 2 X.
With a ¯xed household structure, the latter condition is somewhat less restrictive
than it seems. For suppose a consumer i = hm cares about own consumption and
household composition, which could be important for household formation. But if
household membership, i 2 h, is a fait accompli, one may omit h as an argument of i's
utility function and work with the reduced form E2.
Budget Constraints: Now consider a household h and a price system p 2 I R
`.
For xh = (xh1;:::;xhm(h)) 2 Xh, denote total household expenditure








Then h's budget set is de¯ned as Bh(p) = fxh 2 Xh : p¤xh · p¢!hg: We de¯ne
the e±cient budget set EBh(p) by:
xh = (xh1;:::;xhm(h)) 2 EBh(p) if and only if xh 2 Bh(p) and there is no yh 2
Bh(p) such that
Uhm(yh) ¸ Uhm(xh) for all m = 1;:::;m(h);
Uhm(yh) > Uhm(xh) for some m = 1;:::;m(h):
General Equilibrium:
A competitive equilibrium (among households) is a price system p together
with an allocation x = (xi) satisfying
5(i) xh 2 EBh(p) for h = 1;:::;n, and
(ii)
P
i xi = !.
Thus, in a competitive equilibrium among households (p;x), each household makes
an e±cient choice under its budget constraint and markets clear. E±cient choice by
the household refers to the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not
merely to the aggregate consumption bundle of the household.
Nash Bargaining. An e±cient household choice under a budget constraint may
be the outcome of maximizing a function of the form
Wh(xh) = Sh(Uh1(xh);:::;Uhm(h)(xh));
subject to the budget constraint. A special case thereof is a Nash-bargained house-







with the provision that ®hm ¸ 0 and Uhm ¸ 0 for m = 1;:::;m(h). The bargaining
weight ®hm measures the relative bargaining power of individual i = hm within
household h. In the sequel, we shall concentrate on two-person households, i.e. m(h) =
2. We assume ®h1;®h2 > 0 and ®h1 + ®h2 = 1.
The assumption of Nash-bargained and, hence, e±cient household decisions serves
us well for the present inquiry into the consequences of shifts of bargaining power.
The empirical question of whether collective household decisions are Nash-bargained,
indeed, has gotten a fair amount of attention, in particular in the debate between
Chiappori (1988b, 1991) on the one side and McElroy and Horney (1981, 1990) on the
other side (see Bergstrom (1997) for discussions). There has been a growing number of
empirical studies performing empirical tests of the collective rationality approach which
nests Nash bargaining models as particular cases (Udry (1996), Fortin and Lacroix
(1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), among
others).
Two qualifying comments are warranted. First, the interpretation of the maximands
of Sh as Nash-bargained outcomes assumes that for each member of a multi-person
6household, the individual's reservation utility level is zero. The choice of disagreement
points for intra-household bargaining is somewhat controversial and depends on the
assumed inside or outside options of household members. In Gersbach and Haller
(2002), we consider for example an exit option, that is the possibility that a household
member leaves, forms a single household and maximizes utility at the going market
prices. Such an outside option would complicate notation and the formal analysis, but
not alter the qualitative implications. Therefore, we opt here for a price-independent
reservation utility which we normalize to zero solely for computational convenience.
After a logarithmic transformation of the form (1), this household decision mechanism
proves equivalent to the maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function for the
household, where the bargaining weights become welfare weights.
Second, although maximization of the Nash product (1) describes the way in which
the household reaches an e±cient collective decision, it would be a grave mistake to
attribute further meaning to the maximal value of (1) and to changes of it. Normative
statements always refer to individuals, either one by one, identifying gainers and losers,
or as constituents of society. Pareto-optimality and Pareto-improvements are de¯ned
in the standard fashion.
For welfare comparisons between societies which di®er only with respect to the
bargaining power of individuals in households, one can rely on a modi¯ed version of
the ¯rst welfare theorem. With the possibility of multi-person households and intra-
household externalities, the crucial property of the classical version of the ¯rst welfare
theorem, local non-satiation needs to be adapted. The modi¯ed property stipulates
that each household's e±cient choices under its budget constraint lie on the household's
\budget line". Haller (2000) calls this property budget exhaustion. He shows the
validity of the ¯rst welfare theorem for economies with the budget exhaustion property.
Except for subsection 3.2 the economies and corresponding examples in the paper
all have unique competitive equilibria and possess the budget exhaustion property.
Therefore, equilibrium allocations are Pareto-optimal and comparative statics moves
the economy from one Pareto-optimum to another one. Consequently, if a household
member gains from a shift in bargaining power, then someone else inside or outside the
household must lose.
73 General Comparative Statics for a Two-Person
Household
In this section we perform comparative statics with respect to the balance of bargaining
power within a two-person household denoted by h. We allow for an arbitrary number
of commodities and we consider the general case of intra-household externalities. The
entire population consists of an arbitrary number, n of households.
Negative intra-household externalities allow for the possibility that a household has
a bliss point despite the fact that each household member has monotonic preferences
with respect to her individual consumption (see Haller (2000) for examples). If this
happens, the corresponding notion of competitive equilibrium among households has
to be less demanding. The social feasibility or market clearing condition (ii) has to be
replaced by the free disposal condition
(iii)
P
i xi · !.
If in fact an equilibrium with free disposal prevails and the household does not
exhaust its budget, then after a small shift of intra-household bargaining power, the
resulting equilibrium will most likely be one with free disposal again and the household
will still not exhaust its budget. As a consequence, the household's budget constraint
remains non-binding. This means that the household is not exposed to any price e®ect.
In the sequel, we treat ¯rst the simpler case of non-binding budget constraint and,
hence, zero price e®ect. We then proceed to the case of a binding budget constraint
and typically non-zero price e®ect. This general comparative statics helps identify two
relevant e®ects, a pure bargaining e®ect and a price e®ect.
3.1 Preliminaries
We shall perform comparative statics with respect to the bargaining weights within a
select two-person household h, with members h1 and h2. Whenever convenient and
unambiguous, we shall drop the household name and simply refer to consumers 1 and
2. Without restriction, we may also assume that our select household has the lowest
number, i.e. h = 1 and the other households are labelled k = 2;:::;n. For the sake
of convenience, we shall further adopt the notation ® = ®h1 and 1 ¡ ® = ®h2 so that
comparative statics can be performed with respect to the parameter ® 2 (0;1). Finally,
8denote F ´ lnSh. Explicitly, we obtain
F = F(U1(xh);U2(xh);®) = ®lnU1(xh) + (1 ¡ ®)lnU2(xh): (2)
While ® is treated as variable, the other characteristics of household h as well as all
the characteristics of the rest of the households remain ¯xed. Each household k 6= h is
assumed to choose an e±cient consumption plan, xk 2 EB(p). It may, but need not,
maximize a Nash product.
We assume su±cient regularity in the sense that for each ® 2 (0;1) the economy
has an equilibrium (p(®);x(®)) satisfying:
(iv) local uniqueness and
(v) continuous di®erentiability in ®.
For each ®, at the given price system p(®), household h solves the problem
maxF(U1(xh);U2(xh);®) s:t: G(xh;®) · 0 (3)
where G(xh;®) = p(®)[(x1 + x2) ¡ !h]. The corresponding solution is xh(®) =
(x1(®);x2(®)). The budget constraint G(xh;®) · 0 can be rewritten xh 2 Bh(p(®)).
In turn the household budget set Bh(p(®)) de¯nes a set V(®) of feasible utility al-
locations for household h, given the price system p(®):
V(®) ´ f(V1;V2) 2 I R
2 : (V1;V2) = (U1(xh);U2(xh)) for some xh 2 Bh(p(®))g
In the sequel, the term Pareto frontier refers to the Pareto frontier of V(®) in the
space of utility allocations for the household. In particular, (U1(xh(®), U2(xh(®)) lies
on the Pareto frontier and solves the problem
maxF(V1;V2;®) s:t: (V1;V2) 2 V(®): (4)
Finally, for the household under consideration and a given ®, the term ®-indi®erence
curve refers to a locus in I R
2 given by an identity F(V1;V2;®) ´ const.
It is instructive to look ¯rst at the case ` = 1 of a single good. Assuming that
the equilibrium price is positive, the household's budget set and, therefore, its Pareto
frontier is price-independent and the household's consumption decision is reduced to
9the division of a given pie. Consider an increase from ® to ® + ². Then there are only
two possibilities. It can happen that
(U1(xh(®));U2(xh(®))) = (U1(xh(® + ²));U2(xh(® + ²)))
because of a kinked Pareto frontier or a corner solution. But whenever
(U1(xh(®));U2(xh(®))) 6= (U1(xh(® + ²));U2(xh(® + ²)));
consumer 1 bene¯ts from her increased bargaining power to the detriment of consumer
2. This follows from the fact that an increase in 1's bargaining power, that is, in ®,
renders the household's ®-indi®erence curves steeper.
3.2 Non-Binding Budget Constraint
If the household's budget constraint is not binding, we have a case of equilibrium with
free disposal and the household's problem can be locally described as
maxF(U1(xh);U2(xh);®): (5)






¢ DxiU2 = 0 (6)
holds for i = 1;2. With DUj = (Dx1Uj;Dx2Uj) for j = 1;2, equation (6) amounts to
®
U1




i.e. in general a small utility gain for one household member is accompanied by a small
loss for the other member. For the value function

























= lnU1(xh(®)) ¡ lnU2(xh(®)): (10)
One is tempted to exploit the following immediate consequence of (10):
10Fact 1 The value function (8) increases (decreases) in ®, if U1 > U2 (U1 < U2).
However, this result alone does not allow the further conclusion that the utility of at
least one household member increases (decreases). A look at a more elementary proof
of the fact proves instructive. Namely, let without loss of generality U1 > U2 > 0 and
consider ® and ² with 0 < ® < ® + ² < 1. Then for su±ciently small ², xh(®) 2
Bh(p(® + ²)) and
[U1(xh(® + ²))]®+² ¢ [U2(xh(® + ²))]1¡(®+²)
¸ [U1(xh(®))]®+² ¢ [U2(xh(®))]1¡(®+²)
= [U1(xh(®))]® ¢ [U2(xh(®))]1¡® ¢ (U1=U2)²
> [U1(xh(®))]® ¢ [U2(xh(®))]1¡®:
The last inequality shows that the shift in bargaining power has a \nominal e®ect"
on the household's Nash product even before reoptimization takes place. For this
reason, we cannot conclude from a surge of the household's maximum value of F per
se that the utility of at least one household member has increased. The impact of a
shift of bargaining power has to be assessed for each household member individually.
When we take a closer look at individual welfare, we encounter the same dichotomy
as in the case ` = 1:
One possibility is (U1(xh(®));U2(xh(®))) = (U1(xh(® + ²));U2(xh(® + ²))). For
instance, assume (E2), the absence of externalities. Then a non-binding budget con-
straint for the household requires that both household members be individually locally
satiated at their equilibrium consumption. Then for su±ciently small ², xh(® + ²) 2
Bh(p(®)), xh(®) 2 Bh(p(® + ²)), and xh(®) and xh(® + ²) are close enough so that
Ui(xi(®) ¸ Ui(xi(®+²)) and Ui(xi(®+²)) ¸ Ui(xi(®)), hence Ui(xh(®)) = Ui(xi(®)) =
Ui(xi(® + ²)) = Ui(xh(® + ²)) for i = 1;2.
The second possibility is (U1(xh(®));U2(xh(®)) 6= (U1(xh(® + ²));U2(xh(® + ²))).
Again an increase of ® makes the household's ®-indi®erence curves steeper. Hence, as
long as xh(® + ²) 2 Bh(p(®)) and xh(®) 2 Bh(p(® + ²)), the revised utility allocation
(U1(xh(®+²));U2(xh(®+²))) must lie to the southeast of (U1(xh(®));U2(xh(®)). Thus
consumer 1 bene¯ts from a small increase of her bargaining power to the detriment of
consumer 2.
The foregoing local comparative statics can be easily globalized.
11Proposition 1 Suppose that the household's budget constraint is never binding. If
0 < ®¤ < ®¤ < 1, then one of the following two assertions holds:
(i) U1(xh(®¤)) = U1(xh(®¤)); U2(xh(®¤)) = U2(xh(®¤)).
(ii) U1(xh(®¤)) < U1(xh(®¤)); U2(xh(®¤)) > U2(xh(®¤)).
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. We next examine the case
when the budget constraint is binding.
3.3 Binding Budget Constraint







¢ DxiU2 = ¸(®)p(®); (11)
with positive Lagrange multiplier ¸(®). Moreover, with binding budget constraints,







0(®)[x1(®) + x2(®) ¡ !h]: (12)






0(®)[x1(®) + x2(®) ¡ !h]: (13)
Without further quali¯cation, it is impossible to sign ©0(®). Under additional assump-
tions, however, one can gain some detailed insights. To this end, let us decompose the
e®ects of a change of consumer 1's relative bargaining power from ® to ® + ² into two
parts:
1. a pure bargaining e®ect when ® is changed to ®+² whereas the price system
stays at p(®);
2. a price e®ect when relative bargaining power remains constant at ® + ² while
the price system adjusts from p(®) to p(® + ²).3
3Of course, the price e®ect could be further decomposed into a substitution and an income e®ect.
But that is immaterial to our analysis.
12In equation (13), p0(®) re°ects the price e®ect. If the price e®ect is negligible, i.e.
p0(®) ¼ 0, then ©0(®) can be signed and the conclusion of Fact 1 holds again. As before,
this alone does not allow to sign individual utility changes. To achieve the latter, let us
assume momentarily that the price e®ect is negligible and focus on the pure bargaining
e®ect. Equation (11) is the key to the pure bargaining e®ect. It di®ers from equation
(6) by the right-hand term ¸(®)p(®). In analogy to (7), let us rewrite (11) as
®
U1
¢ DU1 = ¡
1 ¡ ®
U2
¢ DU2 + ¸(®)(p(®);p(®)): (14)
Now consider a change ¢xh away from xh(®) while maintaining the budget identity,
i.e. p(®) ¤ (xh(®) + ¢xh) = p(®) ¤ xh(®) = p(®)!h. Then (p(®);p(®)) ¢ ¢xh =













Thus (7) essentially holds again. Running through the earlier geometric and topo-
logical arguments yields
Proposition 2 Suppose that the household's budget constraint is always binding while
the price e®ect is negligible. If 0 < ®¤ < ®¤ < 1, then one of the following two
assertions holds:
(i) U1(xh(®¤)) = U1(xh(®¤)); U2(xh(®¤)) = U2(xh(®¤)).
(ii) U1(xh(®¤)) < U1(xh(®¤)); U2(xh(®¤)) > U2(xh(®¤)).
Obviously, Propositions 1 and 2 could be combined into one, assuming zero or
negligible price e®ects. If, on the contrary, the price e®ect is drastic, both utilities
may move in the same direction. The magnitude of the price e®ect | whether it is
negligible or drastic or somewhere in between | depends on the size of the household
relative to the economy. It also depends on preferences, including the preferences of
consumers not belonging to the household, as a comparison of Examples 1 to 3 shows.
The focus on a particular household h amid many might suggest that shifts of
bargaining power are sporadic and therefore price e®ects are likely to be negligible.
Our general analysis provides valuable insights in case the change of bargaining power
is a sporadic event, indeed. It helps identify the relevant e®ects. Drastic price e®ects
13will prevail for instance, if the economy is replicated and the same shift in bargaining
power occurs in all households that are replicas of h. This brings us back to the facts
motivating this inquiry, namely enhanced in°uence and more speci¯cally increased
intra-household bargaining power of women in contemporary industrialized societies
as compared with their situation in those societies during the ¯rst half of the 20th
century or their current situation in \traditional" societies. Such changes occur in
many households and, thus, price e®ects may be drastic.
4 Examples
In this section, we illustrate the propositions and striking e®ects of the last section
by means of examples. The entire population consists of a total of three consumers,
two belonging to household h and one forming a one-person household denoted k.
To capture widespread shifts in bargaining power in a large ¯nite population, one
can consider h as a prototype of a two-person household and k as representative of a
one-person household. Literally, one can think in terms of replica economies derived
from the basic economies under consideration, with an equal number of two-person
households like h and one-person households like k.
Throughout this section, there are always two goods: ` = 2. The second good
serves as num¶ eraire. The symbols x;x1;x2;:::;xi;::: denote quantities of the ¯rst
good. The symbols y;y1;y2;:::;yi;::: denote quantities of the second good. c¤
i stands
for the equilibrium consumption bundle of a generic person (individual, consumer) i.
All consumers ful¯ll condition E2, i.e., absence of externalities.
To simplify the exposition of the later examples, we consider ¯rst an auxiliary ex-
ample of an economy consisting of two one-person households, g and k. The respective
consumers are named 0 and 3.
Example 0.
The initial endowments are !0 = (1;0) and !3 = (0;1). The utility representations are
u0 = u0(x0;y0) = x®
0y
1¡®
0 ; with 0 < ® < 1; and





After normalizing the price of the second good, market equilibrium is unique. The






the equilibrium consumption bundles are c¤
0 = (®;1=2); c¤
3 = (1 ¡ ®;1=2).
Now we are prepared to consider the case of three individuals, labelled i = 1;2;3.
Consumers 1 and 2 form the two-person household h. In this household, consumer
1 has bargaining power ® and consumer 2 has bargaining power 1 ¡ ®. Consumer 3
constitutes the single household k. We are going to scrutinize several representative
examples which are almost exhaustive in that they exhibit three possible allocative
responses to a shift of bargaining power within the two-person household:
(a) Only one member is a®ected.
(b) The two members are a®ected in opposite ways.
(c) Both members are a®ected in the same way.
The examples di®er only in individual consumer preferences. The analysis suggests
that less substitutability leads to more drastic price e®ects. We start with the following
example of case (a).
Example 1.
Here consumer 1 bene¯ts from more bargaining power, to the detriment of consumer
3 while consumer 2 is una®ected. Household h is endowed with !h = (1;0). Its two
members, i = 1;2 have utility representations










2 ;0 < ® < 1:
15The characteristics of household k are as in the previous example, that is the endow-






Since the aggregate demand function of household h coincides with the demand function

































Hence as asserted consumer 1 bene¯ts from more bargaining power, to the detriment
of consumer 3. Consumer 2 is una®ected.
In the example, the ¯rst good becomes more valuable to the two-person household
as the bargaining power of the ¯rst consumer increases. This boosts the equilibrium
price of the ¯rst good and the income of the two-person household endowed with
the ¯rst good. The household has become richer both in nominal and real terms.
Since the expenditure on the second good remains constant, the second consumer is
una®ected. But the increase in the residual income to be spent on the ¯rst good more
than compensates for the higher price: consumer 1 is better o® as a consequence of her
increased bargaining power. As for consumer 3, his nominal income derived from the
possession of the second resource remains constant. Therefore, he has become poorer,
has less purchasing power.
From consumer 2's perspective, if bargaining power shifts towards her and prices
are ¯xed, then her welfare is increased. But the resulting price variation o®sets her
gain. That consumer 2 is una®ected by a change in bargaining power seems to be
caused by limited substitutability within the two-person household. This is con¯rmed
by the next example where enhanced bargaining power of consumer 1 translates into
improved welfare for this consumer and welfare losses for consumers 2 and 3.
16Example 2.
Here consumer 1 bene¯ts from more bargaining power to the detriment of consumer 2.
Consumer 3 either gains or loses. Household h is still endowed with !h = (1;0). But

































Again, ® and 1¡® lend themselves as measures of relative bargaining power of consumer
1 and consumer 2, respectively.
Household k has the single member 3, with the same consumer characteristics as before.
We obtain:
Fact 2 A shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to consumer 1 bene¯ts consumer
1 and harms consumer 2, who ends up consuming less of both commodities.
In Example 2 there is more substitutability in the economy than in Example 1.
Example 3 exhibits less substitutability than Example 1, because the preferences of
consumer 3 will be altered from Cobb-Douglas to Leontie®. It turns out that the lack
of substitution by consumer 3 necessitates a major price adjustment to re-equilibrate
the market after bargaining power within household h has shifted. As a result, we
observe a drastic price e®ect: When bargaining power within their household changes,
the equilibrium utilities of consumers 1 and 2 are moving in the same direction.
Example 3.
Here a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to consumer 1 bene¯ts both con-
sumers to the detriment of consumer 3. This example is identical with Example 1,
except that consumer 3 now has Leontief preferences with utility representation
u3(x3;y3) = min(x3;y3):
17After setting s = min(x3;y3), the utility maximization problem for consumer 3 can be
rewritten as
maxs s.t. (p1 + 1)s = 1
with solution s = 1=(p1 + 1).
Household h's demand is (®;(1 ¡ ®)p1). Therefore, market clearing for the ¯rst
good requires 1=(p1 + 1) = 1 ¡ ®. Thus in equilibrium,
p









3 = (1 ¡ ®;1 ¡ ®):
Thus a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to consumer 1 bene¯ts both members
of the household to the detriment of consumer 3. A reverse shift harms 1 and 2, and
leaves 3 better o®.
The examples suggest that comparative statics is sensitive to the degree of substi-
tutability in the economy. Enhanced substitutability appears to mitigate price e®ects.
Indeed, if in a further variation of Example 1, one assumes linear preferences (perfect
substitutability) for consumer 3, with utility representation u3(x3;y3) = x3 + y3, then
the price e®ect is zero. Moreover, for two-good economies exhibiting CES-utility func-
tions for all individuals with the same elasticity of substitution, the magnitude of the
price e®ect can be parameterized by the elasticity of substitution in the economy. The
price e®ect depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution.
The next section will lend additional support to the conclusion that there exists a
negative relationship between substitutability and the price e®ect. We will examine
societies where all individuals have quasi-linear utilities. In that case, the price e®ect
is zero. A gain in bargaining power bene¯ts the consumer at the detriment of the
household member who has less power. Other households, however, are not e®ected
since the price e®ect is zero. This indicates that su±cient substitutability can com-
pletely eliminate the price e®ect, con¯rming the informal conclusion that enhanced
substitutability tends to mitigate price e®ects.
185 Comparative Statics Across Households
Until now we have focused primarily on intra-household e®ects, that is, on the utility
changes in a particular household when bargaining power shifts within that household.
Via a series of examples, we have demonstrated that such a shift of bargaining power
can a®ect the members of the corresponding two-person household in three di®erent
ways: Only one member is a®ected; the two members are a®ected in opposite ways;
both members are a®ected the same way. We have argued earlier that the above exam-
ples can be readily reinterpreted as instances of widespread shifts of bargaining power
in a replica economy. In the resulting replica economy, the main focus remains on intra-
household e®ects, on the repercussions on the members of those households in which a
shift in bargaining power has occurred. However, we have also seen that third parties
can be a®ected. In this section, we redirect our attention to such inter-household or
spill-over e®ects. We start with a neutrality result that can serve as a benchmark.
5.1 A Neutrality Result
We consider a society with n > 1 identical households. Household h(h = 1;:::;n)
has members h1 and h2, called the ¯rst member and the second member, respectively.
There are ` goods (` > 1). The consumption of good k (k = 1;:::;`) by individual
hi (i = 1;2) is denoted by xk
hi. Each household h is endowed with wh = (w1
h;:::;w`
h).





























h2 or lnSh = ®h lnUh1 + (1 ¡ ®h)lnUh2 (18)
where 0 < ®h < 1 is the bargaining power of individual h1 in household h. We denote
equilibrium values by ^ xk
hi and equilibrium utilities by ^ Uhi and ^ uhi. For the following
we assume that for any array of bargaining power parameters (®1;:::;®n) under con-
sideration, each individual consumes a non-negative amount of the natural num¶ eraire
19good ` in every market equilibrium. We also assume that for any array (®1;:::;®n),
the corresponding economy has a unique market equilibrium, up to price normaliza-
tion. These two assumptions are inessential for our argumentation but simplify the
exposition considerably. We shall indicate below which modi¯cations are necessary if
the two assumptions are removed. We consider a market equilibrium and parametric
changes of the bargaining power in household h and obtain:
Proposition 3 (No Spill-overs) With quasi-linear preferences:



















(iv) Suppose that households are homogeneous with respect to individual utility repre-




` + ®h ^ uh2 ¡ (1 ¡ ®h)^ uh1
^ x
`
h2 = (1 ¡ ®h)w
` + (1 ¡ ®h) ^ uh1 ¡ ®h ^ uh2
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix. Proposition 3 illustrates that
with quasi-linear preferences, a change of the bargaining power within a particular
household only impacts on the distribution of the num¶ eraire in household h without
a®ecting the consumption of the ¯rst `¡1 commodities. A local change of bargaining
power has no price e®ect and does not a®ect the utility of individuals in other house-
holds. This also means that a household h cannot manipulate outcomes and possibly
improve utility of household members at the expense of outsiders by misrepresenting
internal bargaining power.
The result is another example of an important line of research that examines in
which circumstances individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences in
the market place. Recently, Makowski, Ostroy and Segal (1999) have comprehensively
characterized continuous, e±cient and anonymous incentive compatible mechanisms
and have shown that such mechanisms must be perfectly competitive, i.e. no agent can
change the Walrasian equilibrium price vector by changing his announced preferences.
Quasi-linear preferences are one of the examples that can allow for incentive compatible
mechanisms or perfect competition. Our investigation shows that with quasi-linear
20preferences a multi-person household has no incentive to misrepresent the internal
bargaining power.
Regarding our simplifying assumptions for the neutrality result, interiority and
uniqueness of equilibrium, giving up the ¯rst assumption requires to work with Kuhn-
Tucker conditions instead of ¯rst order conditions. Without the second assump-
tion, multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. But a market clearing price system
(p1;:::;p`¡1;1) with respect to some array of bargaining power parameters is also
market clearing with respect to all other arrays. Given any such market clearing price
system and the associated equilibrium selection, the conclusion of Proposition 3 con-
tinues to hold.
5.2 Separate Sphere Consumption
We next turn to situations where internal bargaining power changes in a particular
household have spill-over e®ects on other households. In particular, we examine how
individuals are a®ected if similar (dissimilar) persons in other households can increase
their bargaining power. We examine an economy like in the last subsection, but with
di®erent individual preferences. We assume households which are homogeneous at the
beginning but undergo large sociological changes thereafter. We assume ` = 2 and that



































The utility functions are assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and
di®erentiable. The assumption of separate sphere consumption is one convenient way
to divide the society into di®erent sociological groups where individuals are similar
within a group and dissimilar across groups. Here we have two groups, \¯rst members"







where 0 < ®h < 1. We obtain, with^denoting again equilibrium values:
21Proposition 4 (Spill-overs) Under separate spheres consumption, there exists a unique
market equilibrium (up to price normalization) for each array (®1;:::;®n) of bargain-
ing power parameters. Moreover, for any two households g 6= h:
(i) ®h > ®g ) ^ x1
h1 > ^ x1
g1.
(ii) ®h = ®g ) ^ x1
h1 = ^ x1
g1.
(iii) @^ x1
h1=@®h > 0, @^ x1
g1=@®h < 0.
(iv) @^ x2
h2=@®h < 0, @^ x2
g2=@®h > 0.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. Proposition 4 has clear-cut
implications. Consider the sociological groups \¯rst-members" and \second-members",
de¯ned by similarities with respect to preferences. If all individuals in the ¯rst sociolog-
ical group have the same bargaining power (and as a consequence all \second-members"
as well), all households consume their endowments since we are in an equilibrium with
no active trade. An identical shift of bargaining power across all households has no
e®ect on utilities of any individual either since we will again arrive at an equilibrium
with no trade.
The situation is completely di®erent when only some members of a sociological
group enjoy higher bargaining power. For instance, a \¯rst-member" su®ers when
only other \¯rst-members" gain more bargaining power in their respective households.
Conversely, the \¯rst-member" bene¯ts from higher own bargaining power as long as
other \¯rst-members" do not experience a change of bargaining power. The analogue
holds for the other sociological group. Therefore, the main thrust of Proposition 4
is that each individual of a sociological group tends to bene¯t if he can increase his
bargaining power but tends to su®er if others in his group are able to do the same.
For separate sphere economies of the type discussed above we obtain as an immedi-





1) with households that are homogeneous with re-
spect to individual utility functions and endowments. Equilibrium utilities are denoted
by ^ U1
h1; ^ U1
h2 and ^ U2
h1; ^ U2
h2, respectively. Then the following holds:
22Corollary 1 (Power Illusion)
(i) If ®1
h = ®1 for all h and ®2
1 > maxh6=1f®2
hg; then ^ U1
11 < ^ U2
11.
(ii) If ®1
h = ®1 for all h and ®2
1 < minh6=1f®2
hg; then ^ U1
11 > ^ U2
11.
The corollary illustrates that a member of a sociological group is better o® if he has
the highest internal bargaining power even if the level of his power is much smaller
than in another economy where all individuals of the group have the same bargaining
power, that is ®1 > ®2
1. The underlying intuition runs as follows: Diversity across
households opens trade opportunities. The gains from trade will, as a rule, accrue
primarily to the members of a sociological group who have relatively higher bargaining
power than other members of the group. The absolute level of bargaining power is
not important. When, however, the bargaining power of other individuals in the same
sociological group is enhanced as well and all individuals of the sociological group enjoy
an identical level in bargaining power, the original gain is totally eroded.4
5.3 An Example
To illustrate the preceding proposition by solving explicitly for the market equilibria,
we consider again a society with n > 1 identical two-member households.
To simplify notation, we use the symbols xh1 and xh2 to denote quantities of the
¯rst good consumed by household member h1 and h2, respectively. The symbols yh1
and yh2 denote quantities of the second commodity consumed by household member
h1 and h2, respectively.
Each household h is endowed with !h = (1;2). The two members of household h
have utility representations
Uh1(xh1;yh1) = xh1 and
Uh2(xh2;yh2) = yh2:









h2 or ln Sh = ® ln xh1 + (1 ¡ ®) ln yh2:
4When separate sphere consumption does not apply in the strict way postulated above, only partial
erosion will occur, e.g. when all individuals have Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
23where 0 < ® < 1.
The aggregate demand function of household h (xh = xh1+xh2, yh = yh1+yh2) is given
by
xh = ®(2 + p1)=p1;
yh = (1 ¡ ®)(2 + p1):
where good 2 has been used as the num¶ eraire. If ® is the same value across households,
market equilibrium does exhibit zero net trades since excess demands are identical for













1 = (2®)=(1 ¡ ®):
The utilities of the members of each household are Uh1 = 1; Uh2 = 2.
Next consider 0 < ® < ®+" < 1 and 1 · ^ h · n. Suppose that in the ¯rst ^ h households,
bargaining power shifts by " from consumer 2 to consumer 1.
Market equilibrium for the ¯rst commodity obtains if




+ ^ h(® + ")(2 + p1) = np1; (19)
p1(";^ h) =
2n® + 2^ h"
n(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ^ h"
: (20)







2n® + 2^ h"






2n(1 ¡ ® ¡ ")
n(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ^ h"







2n® + 2^ h²







n(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ^ h"
for h = ^ h + 1;:::;n:
24Although the actual ^ h is a natural number we can treat equilibrium consumption levels
















> 0 for h = ^ h + 1;:::;n:
Since x¤
h1 > 1;y¤
h2 < 2 for h = 1;:::;^ h and x¤
h1 < 1;y¤
h2 > 2 for h = ^ h + 1;:::;n,
we obtain the following utility changes:
N The ¯rst-members of households with bargaining power ® + " su®er a utility
loss if the same bargaining power shift occurs in other households as well. Each
member of the sociological group \¯rst-members" bene¯ts from an increase in
his own bargaining power but is harmed if others gain more bargaining power as
well.
N The second-members in households with bargaining power 1¡®¡" su®er a utility
loss but less so if other individuals of his sociological group experience the same.
The second member in households with power 1 ¡ ® bene¯ts if the bargaining
power of other \second-members" decreases.
In sum, each individual of a sociological group bene¯ts if he can increase his bar-
gaining power, but su®ers if others in his group achieve the same. Each individual of
a sociological group is harmed by a decrease in its bargaining power, but less if other
individuals of his group experience the same decrease.
A complete shift of bargaining power has no e®ect on utilities of any individuals
since we are again in an equilibrium with no trade. Bargaining power changes are
completely o®set by the corresponding shifts in equilibrium prices.
256 Concluding Remarks
The current analysis is con¯ned to a general equilibrium model of a pure exchange
economy with a ¯xed household structure and Nash-bargained household decisions
for a select two-person household. General comparative statics as well as numerical
examples lend support to the following conclusions. As a rule, a consumer bene¯ts
from more bargaining power at the expense of her fellow household member and the
other consumer(s). However, in a closed economy, a shift of bargaining power within
a signi¯cant number of two-person households may cause drastic price e®ects. As a
consequence, both members of such a household may bene¯t from or both members
may be harmed by a shift of internal bargaining power. In exceptional cases, it can
happen that a household member is una®ected.
The current analysis further shows that the aggregate equilibrium consumption of
a household can be positively a®ected by a shift of internal bargaining power. This
suggests the possibility that a sophisticated household might succeed in an attempt
to manipulate the market outcome, not by misrepresenting endowments or individual
preferences, but by misrepresenting the internal bargaining power. To illustrate this
novel way of manipulation, which is not yet documented in the literature, let us re-
consider Example 2. Suppose the household pretends that the bargaining power of the
¯rst consumer is higher than it actually is and they submit the corresponding excess
demands to the market. If °1 > °2, i.e. if the ¯rst good is relatively more important
to the ¯rst consumer, they will end up with a higher aggregate amount of the ¯rst
good and the same amount of the second good in equilibrium. Whether or not both
gain from a successful manipulation depends on the internal distribution of aggregate
consumption. If they divided the goods in accordance with their pretended bargaining
power, put their money where their mouth is, then consumer 1 would gain and con-
sumer 2 would lose from manipulation. If they divide the goods according to the true
bargaining power | which ¯xes a proportional sharing rule for each of the goods |
then both gain from manipulation. As noted before, quasi-linear preferences rule out
spill-overs and, consequently, this kind of manipulation.
To reiterate, the current model assumes a ¯xed household structure and pure ex-
change. Removing any of these restrictions leads to a host of new important issues,
which are left to future research.
267 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the household's budget constraint is never binding as hypothesized.
For every ® 2 (0;1), we can choose an ²(®) > 0 so that the local comparative statics
prevail in the open neighborhood N(®) ´ (® ¡ ²(®);® + ²(®)). Each set C(®) =
N(®)\[®¤;®¤] is relatively open in the interval [®¤;®¤]. The family C(®), ® 2 [®¤;®¤],
is an open covering of the compact set [®¤;®¤]. It has a ¯nite subcovering. Let us ¯x
a minimal ¯nite subcovering C(®k);k = 1;:::;K. Without loss of generality, assume
®1 < ®2 < ::: < ®K. We claim that:
(A) If ®¤ < ®1, then ®¤ 2 C(®1).
(B) If ®K < ®¤, then ®¤ 2 C(®K).
(C) For each k · K ¡ 1, there exists ¯k with ®k < ¯k < ®k+1 and ¯k 2 C(®k) \
C(®k+1).
To show (A), suppose it were false, i.e. ®¤ < ®1 and ®¤ 62 C(®1). Then there
exists k > 1 with ®¤ 2 C(®k) and, consequently, C(®1) ½ C(®k), contradicting the
minimality of the covering. Claims (B) and (C) are shown by similar reasoning.
Now ¯x ¯1;:::;¯K¡1 according to (C) and let us go from ®¤ to ®¤ taking small
steps, namely
from ®¤ to ®1; from ®1 to ¯1;
from ¯1 to ®2; from ®2 to ¯2;
::: ::: ::: :::
from ¯K¡1 to ®K; and ®K to ®
¤:
During each step, either the utilities remain unchanged or consumer 1's utility goes
up and consumer 2's utility goes down. Hence the assertion.
27For convenient reference, we state an obvious auxiliary result before proceeding to
the proof of Fact 2.





2 s.t. z1 ¸ 0;z2 ¸ 0;z1 + z2 = z
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Proof of Fact 2
Let x = x1 + x2 and y = y1 + y2 denote the total amounts purchased by household














¾¤ + ¿¤ ¢ y;
y2 =
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¾¤ + ¿¤ ¢ y
where
¾ = ®°1;
¿ = (1 ¡ ®)°2;
¾
¤ = ®(1 ¡ °1);
¿
¤ = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °2):























± = ¾ + ¿ = ®°1 + (1 ¡ ®)°2 = °2 + ®(°1 ¡ °2);
1 ¡ ± = ¾
¤ + ¿
¤ = ®(1 ¡ °1) + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °2) = 1 ¡ °2 ¡ ®(°1 ¡ °2):
28Therefore, in equilibrium, the aggregate consumption for household h is (x;y) = (±; 1
2).
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1 ¡ °1 ¡ (°2 ¡ °1)(1 ¡ ®)
¶1¡°2
which is decreasing in ®. Hence a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to con-
sumer 1 bene¯ts consumer 1 and harms consumer 2, who ends up consuming less of
both commodities.
Proof of Proposition 3
Good ` serves as a num¶ eraire so that the price system assumes the form (p1;:::;p`¡1;1).























¡ ¸h = 0:
5Note that our assumption of su±cient endowments with the num¶ eraire good in all households
















= pk; k = 1; :::; ` ¡ 1: (22)
Because of di®erentiability and strict concavity, the demand of household h for
commodities k = 1;:::;` ¡ 1 is independent of the bargaining power ®h and 1 ¡ ®h
of individual h1 and h2, respectively. Hence, by the budget constraint and budget
exhaustion also the aggregate household demand for commodity ` is independent of
®h. Therefore, the market clearing price system (p1;:::;p`¡1;1) does not depend on
internal bargaining power of households and, hence, changes of bargaining power in
household h have no e®ect on other households. This establishes assertions (i) and (ii).
In contrast to all other goods, a shift of power in household h a®ects the distribution
of the num¶ eraire good in household h, as we shall establish next. Using the notation
for equilibrium values we obtain from equation (21):
®h




^ uh2 + ^ x`
h2
(23)
Since ^ uh1 and ^ uh2 are independent of ®h and ^ x`
h1+^ x`
h2 does not depend on ®h either,
assertion (iii) follows. Using again the fact that variations in ®h have no e®ect on
aggregate excess demand, we conclude that if households are completely homogeneous
with respect to Uhi and wh, then a market equilibrium does not exhibit any positive
net trades. Therefore, ^ x`
h1 + ^ x`
h2 = w`
h and via equation (23) we obtain the expressions
in (iv).
Proof of Proposition 4
We normalize prices by p2 = 1. Then the problem of household h is given by:
max
©
lnSh = ®h lnUh1(x
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where F1 ´ ln Uh1 and F2 ´ ln Uh2. F 0
1 and F 0
2 are strictly decreasing functions.
Hence, for a given p1, a higher (equal) ®h requires a higher (identical) consumption of
good 1 to preserve (24). This shows (i) and (ii).
By the same argument, an increase of ®h raises ceteris paribus the aggregate de-
mand for good 1. Further examination of (24) shows that for ¯xed bargaining power
parameters, aggregate demand for good 1 is a decreasing function of p1. Consequently,
if only ®h is increased, then the equilibrium price b p1 rises and the equilibrium con-
sumption of all ¯rst members except h1 is reduced. Finally, market clearing implies
that the equilibrium consumption of h1 goes up. This shows (iii) and, by symmetry,
(iv).
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